We give explicit constructions of extractors which work for a source of any min.entropy on strings of length n. The first construction extracts any constant fraction of the min-entropy using O(log* n) additional random bits, The second extracts all the tin-entropy using O(log3 n) additional random bits. Both of these constmcdons use fewer truly random bits than any previous construction which works for all min.entropies and extracts a constant fraction of the min.entropy. We then improve our second construction and show that we can reduce the entropy loss to 2 log(l/e) +0(l) bits, while still using O(log3 n) truly random bits (where entropy loss is defined as [(source min-entropy) + (# truly random bits used) -(#output bits)], and E is the statistical difference from uniform achieved). This entropy loss is optimal up to a constant additive term.
Introduction
Roughly speaking, an extractor is a function which extracts (almost) truly random bits from a weak random source, using a small number of additional random bits as a catalyst. A large body of work has focused on giving explicit constructions of extractors, as such constructions have a wide variety of applications. A recent breakthrough was made by Luca Trevisan [Tre98] , who discovered that the Nisan-Wigderson pseudorandom generator [NW94], previously only used in a computational setting, could be used to construct extractors. For certain settings of the parameters, Trevisan's extractor is optimal and improves on previous constructions. More explicitly, Trevisan's extractor improves over previous construetions in the case of extracting a relatively small number of random hits (e.g.. extracting le'-" bits from source with "k bits of randomness", where a > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant) with a relatively large statistical difference from uniform distribution (e.g., constant E, where E is the statistical difference from uniform distribution required from the output). However, when one wants to extract more than a small fraction of the randomness from the weak random source, or when one wants to achieve a small statistical difference from uniform distribution, Trevisan's extractor performs poorly (in that a large number of truly random "catalyst" bits ate needed).
In this paper, we show that Trevisan's idea can be used in a more general and efficient way. We present two new ideas that improve Trevisan's construction. The first idea allows one to extract more than a small fraction of the randomness from the weakly random source. In particular, the idea can be used to extract all of the randomness from the weak random source. This is accomplished by improving the combinatorial construction underlying the NisanWigderson generator used in Trevisan's construction, Applying a result of Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ95] to these extractors, we also obtain improved constructions of highly expanding graphs and s"perco"ce"trators.
The second idea improves Trevisan's construction in the case where the output bits are required to be of a relatively small statistical difference from uniform distribution. The two ideas can he combined, and the final outcome is a set of new extractors that use fewer tndy random bits than any previous construction which extracts at least a constant fraction of the randomness from any weak random source.
Extractors.
A distribution X on (0,l)" is said to have minentropy k if for all z E (0, l}", Pr[X = z] < 2-". Think of this as saying that X has "k bits of randomness." A function EXT: {O,l}" x {0, l}d --t {0, 1)"' is called an (k, E)-e~fr~cmr if for every distribution X on (0, 1)" of min.entropy k, the in-duced distribution Exr(X, Ud) on {0, I}"' has statistical difference at most E from uniform (where Vd is the uniform distribution on {0, I}"), In other words, EXT extracts m (almost) truly random bits from a source with k bits of hidden randomness using d additional random bits as a catalyst. The goal is to explicitly construct extractors which minimize d (ideally, d = O(log(n/e))) while m is as close to k as possible.' Dispersers are the analogue of extractors for one-sided error; instead of inducing the uniform distribution, they simply hit all but a E fraction of points in {0, l}" with nonzero probability.
Previous work. Dispersers were first defined by Sipser [Sip881 and extractors were first defined by Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96] . Much of the motivation for research on extractors comes from work done on "somewhat random sources'~ [SV86, CG88, Vaz87b, VV85, Vaz84, Vaz87al. There have been a number of papers giving explicit constructions of dispersers and extractors, with a steady improvement in the parameters [Zuc96, NZ96, WZ95, GW97, SZ98, SSZ98, NT98, Zuc97. TS98b, Tre98] Theorem 1 For every n, k, m, and E, such rhDr m 5 k 5 n, there are explicit (k,e)-extractors EXT: {O,l)" x {0, IId + {0, I}"' with 1. d = 0 (&#), or 2. d = 0 (log*(+). log(l/y)), where 1 +r = k/(m -1). and l/m 5 7 < l/Z.
In particular, using the second extractor with k = m, we can extract all of the min.entropy of the source using 0 (lo&n/E). log k) additional random bits. (If E is constant then this is just O(log* 11. log k) additional random bits). Using the first extractor with kfm constant, we can extract any constant fraction of the min.entropy of the source using additional random bits. (If E is constant then this is just O(log'n) additional random bits).
An undesirable feature of the extractors in Theorem 1 (and the extractor of Trevisan ITre981) is that the number of truly random bits depends quadratically on log(l/&).
In (nonconst~ctive) optimal extractors and even some previous constructions (discussed later), this dependence is linear. Indeed, some applications of extractors, such as [RR99], require a linear dependence. In our second theorem, we improve our extractors to have a linear dependence on Ml/&).
Theorem 2 For every n, k, m, and E, such that m 5 k 5 n, there are explicit (k,&)-extractors EXT: {0, 1)" x {0, l}d + {O,l}" with I. d=O( Iq~n.'oa(l,e) Wb,"., ).a, 2. d = 0 (log'n log(l/y) log(+)), where Ify = k/(m-1). and l/m 5 y < l/2. Thus, in all cases. the log*(n/E) in Theorem I has been replaced with log'n log(l/&), which is an improvement when E is relatively small. One case of note is when we want to extract m = k'-" bits from a source of min-entropy k > na, for an arbitrarily small constant (I > 0. This is the case in which Trevisan's extractor performs best, using d = O(log*(n/~)/ log n) truly random bits (which is O(log n) for constant E 2 l/poly(n)).
In this case, Theorem 2 gives d = 0 (log n log(+)), which is an improvement for small E.
A summary of our results is given in Figure 1 . A comparison with the best previous constructions is given in Figure 2 . Trev&m's construction [Tre98] uses only O(log'(n/~)/ log k) truly random bits but extracts only a small fraction CkmQ) of the source tin-entropy.
The best previous construction that extracts all of the source min.entropy was given by Ta-Shma [NT981 and used O(log9 n log(l/&)) truly random bits.' Our extractors use more truly random bits than the extractor of [Zuc97] and the disperser of [TS98b], but our extractors have the advantage that they work for any m&entropy (unlike [Zuc97] ), and are extractors rather than dispersers (unlike [TS98b] ). The disadvantage of the extractors of [GW97] described in Figure 2 is that they only use a small number of truly random hits when the source min.entropy k is very close to the input length n (e.g., k = n -polylog(n)).
There are also extractors given in [GW97, SZ98] which extract all of the minentropy, but these use a small number of truly random bits only when the source min-entropy is very small (e.g., k = polylog(n)), and these extractors are better discussed later in the context of entropy loss.
Plugging 
Above, a is an arbitrarily small constant. 
Above, (I is an arbitrarily small constant. This compares with a degree bound of (N/K). 2°tt'0~'0g W*) due to Ta-Shma INT981. Such expanders have applications to SOI--ing and selecting in rounds. constructing superconcentrators, and constructing non-blocking networks [Pip87. AKSS89, WZ95], and the improvements of Corollary 3 translate to similar improvements in each of these applications. We remark that the construction of [WZ951 used to obtain Corollary 3 requires extractors that extract nearly all the entropy of the source.
The Trevisan extractor.
The main tool in the Trevisan extractor is the , which builds a pseudorandom generator out of any Boolean function P such that the security of the pseudorandom generator is closely related to how hard P is to compute (on average). Let S = (a,.
, S,,,) be a collection of subsets of [dl each of size e, and let P: {0, 1)' + {0, l} be any Boolean function. For a stringy E {O,lld. define ylsi to be the string in (0, 1)' obtained by projecting y onto the coordinates specified by 5';. Then the Nisar-Wigderson generator NWs.p: {0, l}d + {0, I}" is defined as NWS.P(Y) = P(~ls,)~~.P(~ls,).
In the "indistinguishability proof' of [NW94], it is shown that for any function D: (0, 1)" + {0, 1) which distinguishes the output of NWs,p(y) (for uniformly selected y) from the uniform distribution on {0, I)"', there is a "small" circuit C (or procedure of small "description size") such that CD(.) (i.e. , C with oracle access to D) approximates P(.) reasonably well. It is shown that the size of the C is related to max+j ISi n Sj[, so one should use a collection'of sets in which this quantity is small, while trying to minimize the seed length d.
We now give a rough description of the Trevisan extractor EXT: {0, I}" x {0, l}d + {O,l)".
For a string u E {0, I}", let ii E {0, l}" be an encoding of u in an error-correcting code and define e = log?'i. We view 2L as a Boolean function ti: {0, 1)' + {0, 11. As above, we fix a collection S = (5'1,. , S,,,) of subsets of [dl of size L Then the extractor is simply
The analysis of this extractor in [Tre98] shows that the output of this extractor is close to uniform as long as the source tin-entropy required is greater than the size of the circuit built in the security reduction of [NW94] . Hence, one needs to make sure this circuit size is not much larger than the number m of output bits while minimizing the number d of truly random bits needed, which is equal to the seed length of the Nisan-Wigderson generator.
Our main improvements.
The first improvement of this paper stems from the observation that actually max; c,,; Z'si"sj' is much better than rna~+~ IS', n Sj I as a measure of the size of the circuit built in the N&u-Wigderson security reduction. So we are left with the problem of constructing set systems in which this quantity is small; we call such set systems weak designs (in contrast to designs, in which maxi+j ISi n Sj I is bounded). We show that with weak designs, one can have d much smaller than is possible with the corresponding designs. The weak designs used in the first extractor of Theorem I are constructed using an application of the Probabilistic Method, which we then derandomize using the Method of Conditional Expectations (see [ASE92] and [MR95, Ch. 51). We then apply a simple iteration to these first weak designs to obtain the weak designs used in the second extractor. We also prove a lower bound showing that our weak designs are near-optimal.
The second improvement is achieved by using a specific errorcorrecting code rather than an arbitrary one. More specifically, we use multilinear error-correcting codes over finite fields. In Trev&n's analysis for the size of the circuit C, the fact that ?i is an error-correcting code (rather than just an arbitrary function) is not used. The circuit complexity of the function 'ii, restricted to the subset of inputs Si n Sj, is hence bounded by zz O(2'si"sj'). Sometimes, however. this is a very bad upper bound. For example.
the circuit complexity of the function C itself (without restriction) is z O(2") which is sometimes much smaller than O(2"). This gap is significant when E is relatively small (because small I req&es a" error-correcting code with very good distance properties, which in turn requires long codewords.) Here, we suggest that if one uses mnltilinearenor-correcring codes and co"sWcts the weak designs appropriately then the circuit complexity of the function ii, restricted to the subset of inputs S; nSj, can be bounded by a value much smaller than 21sinsj'. where the maximum is take" over all functions ("distingtdshers') D: {0, I}" + {O, 1). AdistributionX issaidtohavemin-enrmpy k if for all z, Pr IX = zl < 2-'. It is useful to think of distribudons of tin-entrdpy k as '&ng uniform over a subset of the domain ofsize2k.
We write L7j for the uniform distribution on strings of length i. AfnnctionEx~: (0, l}" x {0, l}d + {O,l}"'isa(k,E)-extractor if for every distribution X of tin-entropy k, ExT(X, .!Jd) has statistical difference at most E from U,,,. We say that a family of extractors {ExT;: (0, I}"' x (0, l}di + {0, I}"'};~, is explicit if EXT; can be evaluated in time poly(ni, d;).
Entropy loss.
Since" (k,~)-extractor EXT: {0, 1)" x{O, l}d + (0, 1)" is given k bits of hidden randomness in its first input and d truly random bits in its second input, one can actually hope for the output length nz to be almost k + d, rather than just k. The quantity A = k + d -m is therefore called the entropy loss of the extractot. Hence, in this language, the goal in constructing extractors is to simultaneously minimize both d and the entropy lass.
Nonconstmctively, one can show that, for any n and k 2 n, there exist extractors ExT,,~: {O,l}" x {0, I}d --t {0, l}*id-A with d = log(n -k) + 2log(l/e) + O(1) and entropy loss A = 2109(1/E) + O(l), and these bounds on d and A are tight up to additive constants [R'I97]. The explicit constructions, however, are still far from achieving these parameters. As for what is known, every entry in Figure 2 has an entropy loss of k + d -m, by detinition. For example. the extractor of [GW97] has an entropy loss of O(n-k+log(l/E)) (whichisonly interesting when k is very close to n) and the extractor of [NT981 and the disperser of [TS98b] have entropy losses of polylog n. I" addition, the "tiny families of hash functions" of [SZ98] give extractors with d = O(k + log n) and entropy loss 2 log(l/E) + O(1): these have optimal entropy loss but are only interesting when k is very small (e.g.. k = polylog n), as d is linear in k.
By combining the second extractors of Theorem I and Theorem 2 with extractors of [SZ98], we are able to achieve optimal entmov loss (LID to a" additive constant):
The combinatorial construction underlying the Nisan-Wigderso" generator are combinatorial designs. In Trevisan's extractor, the parameters of a design correspond to the parameters of the extractor as follows (in the discussion below the parameter E of the extractor is fixed, for simplicity, to be some small constant): Hence, our goal in constructing designs is to minimize d give" parameters m, t, and p (such that p > 1). Notice that l/p is essentially the fraction of the source min.entropy that is extracted, so id&Iv D would be as close to I as oossible. A = Zlog(l/E) + O(l), and 1. d = 0 (log'(+) log k), or 2. d = 0 (log'n log(+) log k).
I" particular, in order for the o"tp"t of the extractor to have statistical difference .Ol from uniform, one need only lose a constant number of bits of entropy. A comparison of this result with previous results on entropy loss is give" in Figure 3 .
Using a relaxed notion of designs also gives some quantitative improvements over [NW941 in the construction of pseudorandom generators from hard Boolean functions. Details of these improvements are given in the full version of this paper. Notice that the dependence on p is very poor. In particular, if we want to extract a constant fraction of the tin-entropy, we need more than mc truly random bits for some c > 0. This is unavoidable with the current definition of designs: if p < 2, the" all the sets must be disjoint, so d 2 m&Y. In general, we have the following lower bound, proved in the full version of the paper. . , ^ "log" indicates tne toganrnm ease L a"" m ' "I " denotes the natural logarithm. If X is a probability distribution or I a finite set, we write x+X to indicate that 2: is selected according to X. TLvo dishibutions X and Y on a set S are said to have sfafistical difference (or variation distance) E if We will show that the parameters of a weak design correspond to the parameters of our extractors in the same way that designs COTresponded to the parameters of Trevisan's extractor. Notice that evcry (e, p)-design is a weak (e, p&design. But one can, for many settings of m, f?. and p, achieve weak (e, p)-designs SI , , S, C [dl with much smaller values of d than possible with (e, p)-designs. Indeed, we will prove the following in Section 6 using a probabilistic ZlQlHtl~~t:
Lemma 9 Momwe,: such a family can be found in rime poly(m, d)
In particular, we can take y = 0(1/m) and extract essentially all of the entropy of the source using d = O(!* log m) t~ly tandom bits. Lemma IO will be proven in Section 6.
For extractors which use only O(log n) truly random bits, where n is the input length, one would need d = O(e). However, one cannot hope to do better than n(e*) using the current analysis with weak designs. Indeed, the following proposition, proved in the full version of the paper, shows that our weak designs are optimal up to the log(l/y) factor in our second construction.
Proposition 11 For every (e, p)-weak design S, , , S, c [dl,
Notice that d = me can be trivially achieved having all the sets disjoint and that log 2p approaches 1 as p approaches 1, so the lower bound for p x 1 is essentially Q(e'). S = (S, , , S,,,) be a collection of subsets of [dl of size e, and let P: {0, I}' -+ {0, l} be any Boolean function. For a string y E {0, l)d. define ylsi to be the string in {0, 1)' obtained by projecting y onto the coordinates specified by S;. Then the NisatWigderson generator NW5.p is defined as NWs.dy) = P(yls,)~..P(~lsJ.
In addition to the Nisan-Wigderson geenerator, the Trevisan extractor makes use of error-correcting codes:
Lemma 12 (error-correcting codes) For every n and 6 there is a code EC&: {0, 1)" + {O,l}" where A = poly(n, l/6) such rhr every Hamming ball ofrelative radius l/2 -6 in {0, l)'contains at mmr l/6' codewords. Furthermore, EC,,6 CM be evolunred in rime poly(n, I/a) and A con be assumed IO be a power of 2.
We can now describe the Trevisan extractor, which takes as parameters n, m, k, and E, where m 5 k < n. Let EC: {0, 1)" + {0, l}r be as in Lemma 12. with 6 = ~/4m and define e = log% = O(logn/E).
For u E {O,l}", we view EC(u) as a Boolean function c {O,l]' --t {O, 1). Let S = (St,. ,S,) be a collection of subsets of [dl (for some d) such that IS,( = e for each i. (How S is selected will crucially affect the performance of the extractor; we will later choose it to be one of our weak designs.) Then the extractor EXTS: {0, 1)" x {0, l}d --t (0, 1)"' is defined as
Em(u,y) = NWs.c(y) =~(~ls~).~.~(~Isrn).
We will now analyze this extractor. The following lemma, due to Yao, allows us to focus on "next-bit predictors" instead of distinguishers.
PI [A(zlzz...zi_,)=zi]>~+~. rez
The following lemmais arefinementof ones in [NW94, Tre981. It shows how, from any next-hit predictor A for NWs,p, one can obtain a "program" of small description size (or circuit complexity) which, using A as an oracle, computes P with noticeable advantage. The improvement over [NW94. Tre98] in Lemma 14 is the use of Cj,< 2'si"sjl rather thanm.2 max*iSinSj' in the boundon \&I. This refined bound illustrates the connection with weak designs.
Proof: Let "=F [A(P(~ls,).~.P(yls;.,)) = WA-,)]
By an averaging argument we can fix all the bits of 1/ outside S; while preserving the prediction probability. Renaming ylsi as z, we now observe that 2: varies uniformly over { 0,l)' while P(y\si) for j # i is now a function Pj of 2 that depends on only IS; n S, I bits of z. So, we have
p,-,(z)) = P(z)] >_ a. T Therefore, it suffices to let 3, be the set of functions f of the form z H (PI(Z), Pz(~), , E-I(~)), where F;(z) depends only some set T;j of bits of z. where \Tij I = IS; n Sj I. The numher of bits it takes to represent each P, is 21TCj' = 2'si"sj'.
So, the total number of bits it takes to represent a function in Z is at most x,2< 2'si"sj', giving the desired bound on log 13 (,1. n We now analyze the extractor EXT~ when we take S to be a weak design. The proof of Proposition 15 basically follows the analysis of Trevisan's extractor in ITre981 except that we use the more refined bounds on I&F,I given by Lemma 14.
Proof: Let X be any distribution of min.entropy k. We need to show that the statistical difference between U, and ExT(X, Ud) is at most E. By Lemma 13, it suffices to show that for every next-bit predictor A: {O,l}'-' + {0, l},
Pr "CX.Y [A (ECYIS,) .~.~(yls;-,)) = a(yls<,] _< ; + ;
where y is selected uniformly from {0, l}d. So let A: {0, I}'-' + {0, 1) he any next-hit predictor and let 3i he as in Lemma 14, so that 13i,1 5 ZPm.
Let B be the set of u for which there exists an f E .C5 such that Pr, [A(f(z)) = is(t)] > l/2 + &/Zm. In other words, B is the set of "bad" u for which ?Z can he easily approximated given oracle access to A. By the property of the error-correcting code given in Lemma 12, for each function f E 3+, there are at most (4mj~)' strings u E {0, I}" such that Pr, [A(f(z)) = E(z)] > l/2 + ~/2m. By the union hound,
Since X has min-entropy k. each u E B has probability at most 2-" of being selected from X, so givesan (k,~)-extractor EXT: {O,l)"x{O, l}d' + {0, l)"",with d'=O($gj)( resp., d' = O(lo&n/c) log(l/y))). By using A + 3 additional bits in the seed and simply concatenating these to the output, we obtain a (6,~).extractor EXT: {0, 1)" x {O, l)d'+a+z 3 {O, 1)". as desired. (In applying Lemma IO, we need to make sure that p < 312, but if p > 312, we can use the weak design of Lemma 9 instead.) n 5 Reducing the error The construction given above works well and improves over previous consttllctions when E is relatively large. However, the number d oftruly random bits needed is quadratic in log(l/E), which is not as good as the linear dependency achieved by some previous constructions. In this section, we improve this quadratic dependency in our constmctions (and in Trevisan's construction) to a linear dependency. We only sketch the proof in this section, due to space constraints and the fact that the results have been superseded by our recent work (in preparation). The quadratic dependence on log(l/&) in our extractor arises from the fact that an (e, p)-weak design requires a universe whose size grows quadratically with e (cf., Proposition I I). In the extractor of the previous section (and Trevisan's extractor), e is taken to be the logarithm of the length of the error-correcting code used (as we view codewords as functions P: {0, l}' -+ {0, 1)). The analysis of the extractor reveals that in order to achieve a small statistical difference E from uniform, we must use an error-correcting code with very good distance properties; namely, one in which no Hamming ball ofradius l/2-O(E/~) contains many codewords. However, an error-correcting code with such a strong distance property must have length at least poly(n, E), resulting in e = R(log(n/E)), and a seed length that is quadratic in log(l/~).
The solution we give in this section is to use an error-correcting code over a large alphabet F, in which we view every codeword as a function from F' to F rather than a function from {0, 1)' to {0, 1). Then it is possible to have a code with very good distance properties (relative to E) with e being independent of E; only the alphabet size F need depend on E. Using this approach, we encounter two problems. The first problem is that the function which computes the codeword P given a predictor A (as in Lemma 14) will be built from functions of the form Pi: F"<"'jl + F. In the proof of Lemma 14, we bounded the description size of the Pj's by the description size of an arbitrary function F'si"sj' + F, which is 2's*nsj' when F = (0, I}. But, as F increases in size, this bound on description size becomes too large to handle. The second problem is that, when we use a large alphabet, the output of the extractor consists of elements of F rather than bits. We will not be able to argue that these elements of F we uniformly distributed, but rather that the i'th element of F in the output is unpredictable given the first i -1 elements of F.
The solution to the first problem comes from our choice of error-correcting codes. We use multilinear error correcting codes (over finite fields) rather than the arbitrary error correcting codes used in Section 4. We can then make use of the fact that the restriction of a multilinear function to a subset of its input variables is still a multilinear function. We can hence bound the description size of thatxstriction by the description size of a multilinear function rather than the description size of an arbitrary function.
The second problem can be solved using standard techniques. Specifically, the fact that the i'th component of the output is unpredictable given the first i -1 components means that the output is what is known as a block-wise source [CG88]. In our case. the block-wise source has blocks of logarithmic length, and standard techniques can be used to extract truly random bits from such a source using a small number of additional truly random bits, Let F be some fixed finitefieldsuch that log IFI z c.log(n/e), where c is some sufficiently large constant (say c = 10). For E 2 l/n, the dependence on E in the extracton of Theorem I can be absorbed into the hidden constant. Thus, we will only need to use the constructions of this section in case E < l/n, and hence we may assume that log/F] = O(log(l/E)).
In this section. we think of an extractor EXT: {0, 1)" x {0, l}d 4 {O, l)m as a function EXT: F"' x Fd' -+ F"", where n' = n/(log IFI), d' = d/(log IF]) and m' = m/(log IFI) (we assume for simplicity that n', d', m', log n', and log IFI are all integer).
Let S = (S,, , S,,,,) be a collection of subsets of [d'] such that JS;] = e for each i, and let P: F' + F be my function. For a string z/ E Fd', define y/s, to be the string in F' obtained by projecting y onto the coordinates specified by S;. Then we define NW;,, a.3
N%.P(Y)
= P(~ls,).~.P(~ls_,).
We will use in this section e = log n'; note that e is bounded by logn, independent of E. Let G be the set of all functions from F1 to F. Thereare IFI" = IFI"' multilinear functions from F' to F (one needs to specify 2' coefficients), so we may define an errorcorrecting code EC: F"' + G which associates to each element u of F"' a distinct multilinear function EC(u) = ?X FL + F. The distance property of this code is formalized by the following standard fact:
We define the function EXTS: F"' x Fd' -+ F"' as
(The function EXT is still not our final extractor). Note that the number of ttuly random bits used by EXT is d'log (F( = O(d' log(l/E)). The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 14. It shows how, from any next-element predictor A for NW; P. one can obtain a "program" of small description size (or circuh complexity) which, using A as an oracle, computes P with noticeable advantage.
Lemma 17 For the proof, we use the fact that the restriction of a multilinear function to a subset of its input variables is a multilinear function, and the fact that the logarithm of the number of multilinear functions in IS; n Sj 1 variables is 2 's*nsj' log IFI. Otherwise. the proof is similar to the one of Lemma 14. Now assume that S is a weak (&&design for p = (k -c log lFl)/m (where, say, c = 10). and let X be any distribution of min.entropy k. Tbe following proposition shows that ExT(X, Ud) doesn't have a good next-element predictor. The proposition is analogous to Proposition 15.
Proposition 18 I.fS = (5'1,. , S,,,,) (with S; c [d']) ir a weak (e, p)-designfor p = (k -c. log [Fl)/m (where c is some sufl cienlly large constant, say c = 10). and X is n distribution of minentropy k then for every newelement predictor A: F'-' --t F,
The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 15. except that we use the distance property of multilinear error-correcting codes given by Lemma 16 and we use Lemma I7 rather than Lemma 14.
In general. the function Ens is not a good extractor. Nevertheless, by Proposition 18, we know that each element ExT(X, lJd) has large min-entropy (6log IF/ bits) given all its predecessors. That is, it is a "block-wise source" in the sense of [CGSS] . in which the min-entropy of each block given the predecessors is a constant fraction of its length (which is log I FI). We can now construct an extractor from EXT~ in one of the following ways:
By applying on the entire output En(X, U,) the extractor of [2x97] that extracts a constant fraction of the min.entropy as long as the min.entropy is at least a constant fraction of the number of bits.
By applying on each element of ExT(X, (id) a pairwise independent hash function h : {O, I}'Op'F' + {0, 1)6"'og'F', where 6' is some small constant (we can apply the same hash function on all the elements).
Both ways are very efficient in terms of the number of additional random bits needed.
The first part of Theorem 2 is now obtained by using the weak designs given by Lemmas 9 (as in the proof of Theorem I). The resulting seed length (using an (e,p)-weak design for p = (kclog IFl)/m) is
However, the number of bits we extract is only 6' log IF\ m' = 6'm z5 #k/p. for some constant 6' < 1. Hence, we can only directly use this to extmct upto a small constant fraction of the minentropy (even if we use the weak designs of Lemma IO). In order to extract more of the min.entropy of the soume, we will need to use iterations. as in [WZ95] . A constant number of iterations will allow us to extract any constant fraction of the min.entropy. In general. to obtain m = k/(1 + y). we will need O(log(l/y)) iterations and hence we need 0 (log' n log(l/E) log(l/y)) additional random bits. , a!}. We will argue that with nonzero probability, Condition 2 holds. Let Y,,,e be the indicator random variable for the event ah E S,. so Pr[Y;,r = I] = l/IB*l = l/[e/ln~l. Notice that for a fixed j, the random variables I',,, , Yj,l are independent. A straightforward calculation shows that E x2
[.. 1
Hence, with nonzero probability, Condition 2 holds, so a set St satisfying the requirements exists. However, we want to find such a set deterministically. This can be accomplished by a stmightforward application of the Method of Conditional Expectations (see [ASE92] and IMR95, Ch. 51). Details can be found in the full vusion of the paper. w Proof of Lemma 10: For simplicity, assume that 1 + y = l/(1 -2-h)andm=29/(1f~).
Letdo= [e/lnZ].eandletd= h do = O(e" log(1 + 7)). We view [dl as the disjoint union of h blocks BI,.
, BI, each of size do. For each 1 E [h], let m, = 2'-' and not = Et;; m,. so C, mt = m. Now we define our weak design S, , , S,,,. For each t E [h], WletS,,,+I,..., Sk,+,, c Bt be a weak (e, 2).design as given by Lemma 9. In other words, we take the ordered union of h weak (e, 2).designs (consisting of m, , mz, , mh sets. respectively) using disjoint subsets of the universe for each. The number of sets is m. the size of the universe is d, and each set is of size e, so we only need to check that for all i E [ml, Cj,; 2's.nsj' < p. (m -1). For i E {n, + 1,. , nt + m,}, S; is disjoint from any S, for any j 5 R, and since &,+I,.
, Sk,+,, is a weak (!, 2).design. Thus, we have 5 nt+z~(mt-1) = 2~--2<(l+y)(m-l), as desired. w 7 Achieving optimal entropy loss Recallthattheenrropy lossofanextractor Exr: {0, 1)" x{O, l}d + (0, I}"' is defined as A = k+d-m, and we can hope for this to be assmall asZlog(l/~)+O(l) withd = log(n-k) +O(l) [RT97]. In constructing our extractor ExTs(u,~) = NWs.&), we "threw away" y after using it as a seed for the Nisan-Wigderson generator and hence the d bits of entropy carried by y were lost. However, the analysis of the Nisan-Wigderson generator actually shows that the quality of the generator is not affected if the seed is revealed. Thus, we define ExT;(u, y) = (y, NWs,&)). Now all the analysis of Exr done in Section 4 actually applies to En' (in Lemma 14,givethepredictor Atheseedy inaddition toNWs,p(y)), and we obtain the following strengthening of Proposition 15: By doing a finer analysis than the one done in Section 4, the entropy loss can be reduced to 2 log(k/e) + O(l), but we will use a different method to make the entropy loss even better. We use a slight modification of an idea due to Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ95] : Suppose we have a (k, E)-extractor EXT: (0,l)" x {0, l}d + (0, l)"+d-a wt entropy loss A. Now. if z is taken h from a source of min.entropy k and y from the uniform distribution on (0, ljld. then conditioned on "most" values of Exr(X, Ud), the pair (I, y) will still have min.entropy close to A. So, we can use a different extractor (with fresh truly random bits) to extract some more of this min.entropy. This is formalized by the following lemma (proved in the full version of the paper). which strengthens the one in Lemma 21 has tw main differences from the one in [WZ951: First. we use the second extractor on the pair (z, y,) rather than just 2; this enables us to make the output length close to k + d, + dz rather than just k. Second, the statistical difference from uniform in EXT has a better dependence on s (in [WZ95], the expression is ~1 + EZ + 2-'). Now let us see how Lemma 21 can be used to make our entropy loss optimal. If we use the extractor given by Proposition 20 as ExT,, Lemma 21 tells us that we need only find an extractor EXT~ which works well for very small (i.e., logarithmic) min.entropy. The following extractor of Srinivasan and Zuckerman [SZ98] achieves exactly what we want:
Lemma 22 (lSZ981) For every n, k < n, and E > 0. there is an erplicir (k, E)-afracIo~ En {O,l)" x {0, l}d + [O, l}*+d-a with entropy loss A = Z[log(l/&)l + 2 andd = O(k + logn).
The first extractor of Theorem 4 follows from combining the extractors of Proposition 20 and Lemma 22 via Lemma 21. The second extractor is obtained in a similar manner, combining the extractors of Theorem 2 with those of Lemma 22 instead. Details are given in the full version of the paper.
